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Haney: Injustice in Death Penalty Cases

EXONERATION AND WRONGFUL
CONDEMNATIONS:
EXPANDING THE ZONE OF
PERCEIVED INJUSTICE IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES
CRAIG HANEY'

INTRODUCTION

Dramatic exonerations of death-sentenced and other prisoners have had a significant impact on the public's view of our
criminal justice system. For many citizens, an aura of infallibility has been shattered. This, in turn, has certainly affected
their views on capital punishment,l and helps to account for
modestly but consistently declining death penalty support over
the last decade or more. 2 In particular, the previously wide* Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz; B.A., University
of Pennsylvania; M.A., Stanford University; Ph.D., Stanford University; J.D. Stanford
Law School.
1 A number of studies have established a relationship between skepticism about
the fairness and reliability of the system of capital punishment and support for a moratorium on death sentencing. See, e.g., Scott Vollum, Dennis Longmire, & Jacqueline
Buffington-Vollum, Confidence in the Death Penalty and Support for Its Use: Exploring
the Value-Expressive Dimension of Death Penalty Attitudes, 21 JUSTICE Q. 521 (2004).
2 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Second Thoughts: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty at the Turn of the Century, in BEYOND REPAIR:
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 7, 16 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003); James Liebman, The
New Death Penalty Debate What's DNA Got to Do With It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 527, 534 (2002). Various news reports have carried the same message of declining
death penalty support in recent years. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Death Penalty Support
Drops as Debate Shifts; Foes Turning Focus from Moral Issues to Flaws in the System,
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spread and largely unchallenged assertion that capital cases
were routinely handled with such care that mistakes rarely, if
ever, occurred has been placed in doubt. 3 Moreover, the miscarriages of justice that have given rise to these new-found
concerns are fundamental and dramatic, involving persons who
literally did not commit the crimes in question but were held
accountable for them nonetheless. 4
In addition, there have been many more of these errors
than most laypersons (or scholars) had predicted or believed
possible. For example, in one often-cited turn of events, it was
reported that the state of Illinois removed more wrongfully
convicted people from its death row than were added as a result of new death sentences. 5 The fact that the miscarriages in
question were so fundamental yet so numerous suggests that
the underlying causes are systemic in nature, rather than the
result of mere inadvertence or occasional human error. The
exonerations of wrongfully convicted, factually innocent persons have spurred calls for moratoria on the imposition of capital punishment, at least until fundamental reforms can be introduced into the system by which the death penalty is
administered. 6
In this article I argue that despite the very serious nature
and surprisingly large number of these kinds of exonerations,

BALTIMORE SUN, July 25, 2001, at AI.
3 As two commentators put it, before the "innocence revolution" began in the
early 1990s, "we, as a society, believed our criminal justice system was highly accurate.
We believed that those caught and executed were guilty, and that the innocent were
never executed or even charged, protected by a system that rarely, if ever, made mis·
takes." Mark Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our "Evolving
Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 265, 265·
66 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
4 Carol Steiker and Gordon Steiker term these kinds of exonerations as involving "pure" innocence. They note that, although some exonerated persons were "not
wholly blameless," it is the cases of pure innocence, "with DNA exonerations serving as
the paradigm of 'erroneous' convictions," that have "captured popular and political attention." Carol Steiker & Jordon Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: That Attraction
and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587,598 (2005) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence].
5 See Rob Warden, fllinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It
Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 382 (2005).
6 As two knowledgeable commentators put it, "[t]he driving concern is the risk
of death-sentencing and executing innocents. This issue emerged as lawyers and journalists brought to light numerous instances of innocents erroneously sentenced to
death." Steiker & Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence, supra note 4, at 594.
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revelations about factually innocent death-sentenced prisoners
represent only the most dramatic, visible tip of a much larger
problem that is submerged throughout our nation's system of
death sentencing. That is, many of the very same flaws and
factors that have given rise to these highly publicized wrongful
convictions also produce a more common kind of miscarriage of
justice in capital cases. I refer to death sentences that are
meted out to defendants who, although they may be factually
guilty of the crimes for which they were placed on trial, are not
"death worthy" or "deserving" of the death penalty. This includes the many who, if their cases had been handled properly
by competent counsel at the time of trial and adjudicated in a
fairer and more just system, would have been sentenced to life
instead.
This more common kind of miscarriage of justice has resulted in, to use James Liebman's evocative phrase, "the overproduction of death."7 Liebman has argued that "[t]rial-Ievel
actors drastically overproduce death sentences," rendering
many more times the number of death verdicts than "the system means to carry out," and that they do so because of the
"strong incentives" they reap in the form of the "robust psychic,
political, and professional rewards."8 In addition to these incentives and rewards, I argue that there are other aspects of
the system of death sentencing that consistently bias and badly
distort the outcome of capital cases. Beyond the flaws and biases that produce the wrongful convictions (or what might be
called "the overproduction of guilt") there are a number of additional problems, many of which are unique to death penalty
cases, that undermine the fairness and reliability of the process
of death sentencing itself.
In this regard, I should emphasize that there is no inherent or necessary tension between the "exoneration movement"
and more comprehensive efforts at reforming or eliminating
the system of capital punishment. That is, I do not believe that
what Carol and Jordon Steiker have called "the seduction of
innocence" necessarily diverts attention from the many other
flaws in the system of death sentencing. 9 Indeed, despite the

7

James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2033

(2000).

8Id. at 2032.
See Steiker & Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence, supra note 4.
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surprisingly high number of exonerations, it is also still true
that most people who are tried for death penalty crimes are factually guilty. But this concession is no cause for celebration or
self-congratulation about the quality of justice or the quantity
of due process that is routinely dispensed in capital cases. 10
The forces that produce miscarriages of justice in guilt determinations still too often combine with other biasing influences
to compromise and undermine the quality of many other
equally important decisions that are made in death penalty
cases, raising profound questions about the fairness and reliability of the ultimate outcomes.
Thus, many aspects of our flawed system of capital punishment not only increase faulty guilt determinations but also
can result in defendants being convicted of a higher degree of
homicide than is justified by the actual facts of the case and
operate to facilitate death sentences when life is the legally and
morally correct verdict. Elsewhere I have termed this "death
by design"-the special social psychological design of our system of death sentencing that enables ordinary citizens to engage in behavior that, under normal circumstances, many of
them would be unable to do-namely, to take the life of another
person.l1 In fact, I have suggested that without the elaborate,
legally-supported network of practices and procedures that facilitate people overcoming their deep-seated psychological barriers against doing the "deed of capital punishment,"12 the
death penalty might well fall into disuse in our society. That
is, it is possible that too few normal, average persons would be
capable of regularly (and sometimes enthusiastically) calling
for the death of their fellow citizens, let alone, as jurors, taking
steps designed to bring those deaths about.
Our system of death sentencing has come to rely on the
practices and procedures that help people overcome deepseated psychological barriers against killing. They lower the
threshold that is required for conviction, for conviction of
death-eligible crimes, and for condemning someone to death.
Collectively, these practices and procedures are built into the
very system of death sentencing; they are part of its normative
10 See e.g., Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 501 (2005).
11 CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM (Oxford University Press 2005).
12 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1613 (1986).
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mode of operation. They certainly help to account for some of
the wrongful convictions that have shaken the system so profoundly in recent years, but they also contribute to the wrongful death sentences that are still often overlooked. As I will
suggest in the final section of this article, because these aspects
of the system operate cumulatively and in tandem, they pose a
set of inter-related problems that must be solved in a comprehensive rather than piecemeal fashion.
I.

BROADENING THE CATEGORY OF "EXONERATION":
ERRONEOUS DETERMINATIONS OF FACTUAL, LEGAL, AND
"MORAL" GUILT

In thinking about the nature of "exoneration" in the context of death penalty cases, it is useful to parse the concept of
"guilt" into three separate components. I3 First, there is the
most basic kind of guilt, and what most laypersons think about
when they consider whether an accused is "guilty" of a criminal
offense. It is what might be called "factual guilt." In the classic
definition of the elements of a crime, this is the actus reus, the
physical or behavioral component of the criminal act. It requires the factfinder to address the threshold question that
must be answered before legal responsibility can be ascribed: is
this the person who carried out the physical acts that are defined as criminal?
The exonerations that have garnered so much media and
legal attention in recent years have been ones in which this basic kind of factual guilt was placed at issue. In each case, the
criminal justice system arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and
sentenced (sometimes to death) persons who were factually innocent of the crimes of which they had been accused. That is,
they were the "wrong" people, in the most basic and fundamental sense. The overwhelming majority of them had nothing
whatsoever to do with the acts or behaviors that resulted in
criminal harm-they were nowhere near the crime, knew nothing about it and yet, somehow, they were convicted and sen13 The fiTst two components reflect the traditional elements of a crime. Thus,
"[i]n the vernacular of the common law, these requirements correspond, roughly speak·
ing, to the traditional elements of actus reus and mens rea, the physical and mental
aspects of a crime, respectively." Samuel Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral
Justification of Executive Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12·13 (2005). See also
WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 239 (4th ed. 2000).
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tenced for having committed it.
Even though factual guilt is what most laypersons mean
when they talk about whether someone is guilty-or in the case
of miscarriages of justice and subsequent exonerations,
whether an "innocent" person has been wrongly convictedlaw-trained persons know that, for the great majority of crimes,
there is another important element of a crime that must be
proven before someone can be held legally responsible. Thus,
mens rea pertains to the state of mind of the defendant just before and often during the act in question.1 4 Except for strict liability crimes, criminal defendants must have general intentessentially, be conscious and sane-at the time the crime was
committed. 15 In addition, for most offenses, there are other aspects of the perpetrator's state of mind in the form of various
specific intents that determine the degree of the crime for
which he or she can be convicted.
Mens rea is hardly a secondary matter in establishing
criminal responsibility or what might be called "legal guilt."
This is especially true in homicide cases where the issue of
what the defendant was thinking in the course of the crime often garners more legal attention than any other. Under the
law of homicide in California, for example, mental states like
"intent to kill," "malice aforethought," and "premeditation and
deliberation" distinguish manslaughter from murder, and second- and first-degree murder from one another.1 6 Depending
on what a jury decides a homicide defendant was thinking just
before and during the time he performed the criminal act-in

14 Martin Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in
the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (1993) [hereinafter
Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma] ("Early in the English legal tradition, the idea arose

that criminal liability entails some mental activity on the part of the offender relating
to the proscribed conduct."). I do not mean to suggest that there is anything straightforward or uncomplicated about the definition of mens rea or the application of the concept to actual fact patterns. See, e.g., Jeremy Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21 (2001).
15 Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma, supra note 14, at 667.
16 See, e.g., Charles Hobson, Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L.
REV. 495, 504-05 (1996). More generally, see the classic article Herbert Wechsler &
Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261 (1937).
Other statutes employ different mental states to grade the degrees of homicide. For
example, the Model Penal Code relies on purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. For a discussion, see Alan Michaels, "Rationales" of
Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54
(2000). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 187-89 (West 2006).
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this case, the unlawful taking of a human life-he or she may
end up serving a term of years in prison, receive a sentence of
life without the possibility of parole, or become eligible for the
death penalty.
Finally, there is a separate guilt-related issue that has
special significance in death penalty cases. It poses the question of what might be called "moral guilt": how blameworthy is
the person for the actions in question? Blameworthiness or
culpability is a key determinant of the amount or level of punishment a wrongdoer is thought to deserve. Professors Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg are correct to suggest that
"[c]alibrated measures of culpability are embedded in the
criminal law, particularly in mens rea doctrine and the law of
homicide."17 Yet there is more to assessing culpability than
merely establishing the degree of the crime. 18 For this reason,
the issue of moral guilt-to the extent that it is considered explicitly at all-tends to surface in sentencing proceedings. It
arises when decisions are made about the precise amount of
punishment that should be meted out to an otherwise factually
and legally guilty defendant. 19
17 Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799,
827 (2003).
18 Phyllis Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness: Differentiating
Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 36-37
(1997). Although she believes the approach is problematic, Professor Phyllis Crocker
noted that the United States Supreme Court's theory of culpability in capital cases employs a distinction akin to the one I have made between legal and moral guilt. That is,
the Court acknowledges the two very different kinds of inquiries in which capital jurors
must engage:

At times the Court seems to differentiate between the two by casting the punishment phase determination as one about the defendant's moral culpability, as
opposed to his purely legal culpability at the guilt phase. In this respect, a defendant's moral culpability for murder may be greater or lesser, depending on
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, even though his legal culpability remains the same. Id. (footnote omitted)
To avoid confusion over the similarity in terms, especially the incorrect inference that
once someone has been found legally responsible for a death penalty crime, he automatically "deserves" the death penalty, Professor Crocker proposes to substitute the
term "deathworthiness" for "moral culpability." Id. at 22.
19 An example of this distinction appears in the opening paragraph of Justice
Stevens's Atkins opinion, where he notes that although mentally retarded persons "who
meet the law's requirements for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished
when they commit crimes," the disabilities from which they suffer (particularly with
respect to reasoning, judgment, and impulse control) mean that they cannot "act with
the level of moral culpability" required to be eligible the death penalty. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002). In addition to mental retardation, the youthfulness of
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Sentencing proceedings are the very centerpiece of many
death penalty cases. They are often the most elaborately prepared and intensely contested stage of the trial. As Ronald Tabak put it, "in most capital punishment cases, the main battle
occurs during the penalty phase, not the guilt/innocence
phase."2o This may be in part because there often appear to be
so few doubts about whether the defendant is factually or legally guilty at the outset of many capital cases (although, to be
sure, the exoneration movement has given pause to death penalty lawyers, cautioning them against taking anything for
granted, including in cases where the guilt phase issues seem
"open and shut"). However, after a capital defendant has been
found legally responsible for the criminal act or acts for which
he or she is being tried, capital jurors still must render a profoundly important second verdict, choosing between a sentence
of life or death. Not only are the stakes extraordinarily high
but the law has significantly broadened the nature of the inquiry in which they must engage. Thus, jurors are supposed to
look beyond a single act and consider blameworthiness or
moral guilt over an entire life course. They are invited to ask,
in essence, what kind of person is this?
The increased legal emphasis on the separate determination of moral guilt or blameworthiness in capital cases began
some thirty years ago. When the U.S. Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976,2I it made the individualized
determination of the "deathworthiness" of capital defendants
the hallmark constitutional death sentencing. For example, in
Woodson u. North Carolina,22 the Court invalidated that state's
death penalty statute because it created a system of mandatory
death sentencing that did not include a separate inquiry into
the overall culpability of the defendant. Instead, to decide
whether death is the appropriate punishment, the Court ;required an inquiry that went beyond simply determining

the defendant also categorically precludes death penalty imposition. Roper v. Sim·
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). Otherwise, the question of moral guilt or overall culpability is decided by capital jurors on a case-by-case basis.
20 Ronald Tabak, The Egregiously Unfair Implementation of Capital Punishment
in the United States: "Super Due Process" or Super Lack of Due Process?, 147
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 13, 22 (2003).
21 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
22 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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whether the defendant was factually and legally guilty.23
Indeed, Justice Stewart's opinion in Woodson underscored
the importance of a "[p]articularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of the convicted defendant."24 This separate assessment should include, as Stewart
put it, consideration of the "compassionate or mitigating factors
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."25 The importance of this unique determination was reiterated and emphasized in a line of cases that began two terms later in Lockett
v. Ohio 26 and has continued to the present.27 Justice O'Connor
articulated the core purpose of this "individualized assessment
of the appropriateness of the death penalty" as one requiring
capital juries to engage in a "moral inquiry into the culpability
of the defendant."28
Determinations of each one of the different types of guilt I
have described-factual, legal, and moral-can produce its own
kind of miscarriage of justice (and, by implication, its own form
of exoneration). As I noted earlier, most of the high profile exonerations that have heightened public and political concerns
involved the erroneous determination of factual guilt-cases in
which the police arrested and the prosecutors convicted the
"wrong" person. Because the person who actually committed
the crime must be in custody before justice can begin to be
done, factual guilt determinations involve a very basic threshold issue. Not surprisingly, these miscarriages are the ones
that garner the most attention and create the most fundamental doubts about the fairness and reliability of the criminal justice system.
The other obvious reason that these kinds of exonerations
have provoked so much legal, political, and public debate is
that they are subject to more objective, definitive forms of proof
(and disproof). That is, factual guilt determinations are bound,
23Id. at 303-04.
24 Id. at 303.
25Id. at 304. See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that "[w]hat is essential is that the jury have before it all possible
information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.") (emphasis
added).
26 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
27 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
28 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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at least to some degree, by the physical laws of nature. In addition, increasingly sophisticated forensic technologies (especially DNA testing) now can definitively rule out potential perpetrators. Thus, in the case of such an exoneration, not only is
the nature of the erroneous factual guilt determination a basic
one, but the demonstration of error, because of the physical
principles on which it is based, is usually decisive and beyond
dispute. 29 However much they help to insure correct determinations of factual guilt (and in identifying those cases in which
incorrect determinations were made), few if any of these definitive, objective techniques are available to assist in the evaluation of what I have termed legal and moral guilt. In the case of
legal guilt, decisions about state of mind involve inherently
subjective assessments. Indeed, an assessment of what someone was or might have been thinking at a particular point in
time is the very epitome of subjectivity. It is not, therefore,
susceptible to the same kind of clear-cut, objective disproof.
Similarly, few if any judgments about the overall culpability of an otherwise factually guilty person can be made on the
basis of a single, definitive scientific test. 30 Indeed, the amount
of imprecision and equivocality is greatest for assessments of
moral guilt, not because such judgments are necessarily more
subjective than in the case of mens rea, but rather because so
many potential issues can be brought to bear on the decision.
This is especially true for blameworthiness in a capital case,
where a defendant's entire life course is placed at issue. Thus,
not only are the standards to be considered by the jury in determining whether to impose death sentence ''by necessity,
somewhat general,"31 but the factors that can be taken into ac29 As Innocence Project Director Barry Scheck put it, DNA testing has given us
"a remarkable data set that's never existed before in the history of our criminal justice
system where you can say these people are stone cold innocent. We can't argue about
it." Barry Scheck, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L. REV.
117, 171 (2002). Of course, not all exonerations of factually innocent persons involve
DNA or such clear-cut, scientific demonstrations of error.
30 I suppose that one limited exception to this generalization might occur in the
case of mental retardation. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), as I noted ear·
lier, the Court decided that mentally retarded defendants were not eligible for the
death penalty because they lacked the requisite moral culpability. The determination
of whether a defendant is mentally retarded turns in large part on the results of scientific tests. However, even here, intelligence and related tests, and their implications
for the ultimate legal question, are somewhat more open to interpretation than the
DNA and other testing relied upon in many of the factual guilt exonerations.
31 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193·94 (1976). The Model Penal Code, which
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count also are so many and varied. 32
However, simply because determinations of legal and
moral guilt are not subject to objective and definitive disproof
does not mean that the decisions cannot be demonstrably incorrect, or serve as the basis for egregious miscarriages of justice, or provide an occasion for their own kind of exoneration.
In fact, because judgments made about states of mind (in the
case of legal guilt) and attributions of blameworthiness for a
single act or entire life course (in the case of moral guilt) are
inherently subjective, they are much more susceptible to the
psychological pressures and influences that may compromise
their fairness and reliability.
In the broadest sense, then, the case of an erroneous death
sentence occurs whenever a person is sentenced to die who, if
he had been subjected to a fairer and less biased legal system
and decision-making process, would have been sentenced to life
instead. These cases are ones in which capital defendants, although they have not been "wrongly convicted," have been
"wrongfully condemned." The legally unique and unusually
broad-based nature of the capital penalty-phase inquiry in
which these decisions are made renders it especially vulnerable
to these kinds of miscarriages of justice.

II. A FLAWED, "ERROR-PRONE" SYSTEM OF DEATH
SENTENCING

Samuel Gross and others have argued persuasively that
erroneous determinations of factual guilt may be more likely to
occur in capital cases than in other kinds, a surprising claim
given the longstanding and widespread contention that death
is different and that death penalty cases are typically handled

served as the basis for many of the new death penalty statutes that the Court approved
in 1976, listed eight aggravating and eight mitigating circumstances. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). On the other hand, the Georgia
statute that the Court approved in Gregg specified ten aggravating circumstances but
no mitigating circumstances. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166. Even so, Justice Stewart suggested that a capital defendant in Georgia was "accorded substantial latitude as to the
types of evidence that he may introduce." [d. at 164.
32 See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and
the Logic of Capital Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (1995) [hereinafter Haney,
The Social Context of Capital Murder] (discussing some of these many and varied factors).
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differently, and much better, than other cases. 33 Yet, as Gross
has noted, there are many factors at work in capital cases that
increase the probability of a wrongful conviction. These factors
impinge on murder cases in general to distort and undermine
the normal fact-finding process, and they operate with even
more effect in those murder cases that are death-eligible. They
include such things as the added pressure on the police and
prosecutors to solve high visibility homicides, the way that
pressure affects how these officials investigate and process the
case, and the heightened stakes in murder cases that may produce unreliable witness and jailhouse "snitch" testimony.34
However, beyond the astute categorization of the factors
that generate miscarriages of justice at the level of factual guilt
that Gross and other scholars have made,35 the zone of perceived injustice in capital cases can be broadened to include the
influence and impact of factors that contribute to erroneous determinations of legal guilt and, to an even greater extent, what
I have termed moral guilt. 36 Expanding this zone of perceived
injustice would entail giving much greater attention to miscarriages of justice in which people are convicted of higher degrees
of crime than are warranted by the facts and, more broadly,
those who receive death sentences in part as a result of the
strong "death tilt" that is built into the design of our system of
death sentencing. Below I discuss several categories of factors
33 Samuel Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996) [hereinafter Gross]. Like most scholars who
address this issue, Professor Gross limited his analysis to erroneous determinations of
what I have termed "factual guilt"- specifically, "convictions of 'the wrong person'; a
defendant who did not do the act that caused the death or deaths for which he was convicted." Id. at 475.
34 Id. at 476-88.
35 Gross, supra note 33; see also Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); MICHAEL RADELET,
HUGO BEDAU & CONSTANCE PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (Northeastern University Press 1992).
36 Among the primary causes of wrongful convictions identified by scholars and
advocates, two are especially problematic, namely, incompetent lawyers and prosecutorial suppression of evidence that is favorable to the defense. Compare JIM DWYER,
PETER NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIvE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND
OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 172-92 (Doubleday 2000), with
James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1864 (2000). For reasons I
discuss later in this article, however, I believe that what I have termed "wrongful condemnations" may be caused by a broader and more varied set of psychological influences.
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that may contribute to miscarriages of justice in which capital
defendants are wrongfully condemned.
A.

MEDIA BIAS AS A SOURCE OF WRONGFUL CONDEMNATIONS

The media may contribute significantly to miscarriages of
justice, especially in capital cases. 37 For one, citizens, voters,
and jurors are treated to a steady flow of misinformation about
capital punishment. This misinformation pertains not only to
who commits capital crime and why, but also to the way the
system of death sentencing actually operates in our society and
whether it has any real utility in the fight against violent
crime. The inaccuracies are not random, but rather slanted in
such a way as to favor death sentences over life. In fact, much
social science research indicates that the widespread dissemination of misinformation has produced basic misconceptions
about the death penalty held by many members of the public. 38
Researchers also have found that support for the death penalty
is directly related to those misconceptions. That is, the more
persons endorse inaccurate beliefs about the death penalty, the
more likely they are to favor it. 39
As a result, many members of the public are left with only
flawed and incomplete knowledge with which to reason and decide about whether and when capital punishment is justified.
In the final analysis, this may result in some persons being
sentenced to death who, if the public were more fully and accurately informed, would be sentenced to life instead. 40 A juror
37 I am aware that, especially in recent years, the media also have played an important role in publicizing and even helping to uncover miscarriages of justice. But I
believe that these cases still represent notable exceptions rather than the rule. Moreover, the media still often focus only on the fact that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, without including any overall analysis of its causes (and certainly not ones that
might implicate the media themselves). The public is often left with the impression
that such miscarriages are infrequent and, while certainly regrettable, are the product
of human error or caprice rather than structural flaws in the criminal justice system
itself.
38 See James Fox, Michael Radelet & Julie Bonsteel, Death Penalty in the PostFurman Years, 18 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499 (1990-1991); Craig Haney, Aida
Hurtado & Luis Vega, "Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing Effects,
18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 619 (1994) [hereinafter Haney, Hurtado & Vega].
39 See HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN supra note 11, at Chapter 4.
40 See, e.g., Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire, Americans' Attitudes
About the Ultimate Weapon: Capital Punishment, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 93-108 (Timothy Flanagan & D. Longmire eds., 1996).
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whom the media have convinced that the death penalty should
be imposed because it deters murder or will cost the state less
money than life imprisonment, or who believes that the system
of capital punishment is free of the taint of racial bias and is
administered so carefully that innocent persons are virtually
never sentenced to death, is not only misinformed but is someone who is poised to render an erroneous death verdict. Cases
of capital defendants who have been wrongfully condemned because their death sentences were based in large part on mediabased myth and misconception represent serious but typically
overlooked miscarriages of justice.
The media also playa direct role in helping to shape the
way people think about crime and the people who commit it.
Studies of the impact of media coverage of crime-related topics
bear this out. According to at least one survey, the media were
the most important source of information about the crime problem for ninety percent of the respondents.41 Many researchers
also have observed that the media focus so often and extensively on crime that they distort and exaggerate its prevalence
and significance. The media's obsession with crime may produce inflated or unjustified crime-related fears that lead members of the public to demand harsh punishments, including the
death penalty.42
The media not only help to create and maintain people's
general beliefs about crime and punishment but also shape
their views of criminal defendants. There is a consistent slant
to the perspective that is conveyed. For example, John Sloop
analyzed the way the media portrayed the perpetrators of
crime over the more than forty-year period from 1950-1993. 43
He found evidence of a dramatic shift away from depicting
them as redeemable or subject to personal growth and change.
Instead, there was a growing tendency to show prisoners as ir41 RICHARD SURRETTE, MEDIA, CRIME & CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND
REALITIES 58 (Wadsworth 1992).
42 See, e.g., Melissa Barlow, David Barlow & Theodore Chiricos, Mobilizing Sup·

port for Social Control in a Declining Economy: Exploring Ideologies of Crime Within
Crime News, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 191 (1995); Jason Ditton & James Duffy, Bias in the
Reporting of Crime News, 23 BRITISH J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 159 (1983); S. Gorelick, "Join
Our War':· The Construction of Ideology in a Newspaper Crimefighting Campaign, 35
CRIME & DELINQ. 421 (1989); Edie Greene, Media Effects on Jurors, 14 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 439 (1990).
43 JOHN
SLOOP, THE CULTURAL PRISON:
PUNISHMENT (University of Alabama Press 1996).
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rational, predatory, dangerous, and incapable of being reformed. Violent criminals in particular were depicted as "animalistic and senseless," governed by their "warped personalities."44
This media stereotype of the "typical" criminal may exacerbate pre-existing tendencies to attribute deviant behavior exclusively to negative traits, malevolent thoughts, and bad
moral character. Indeed, as one legal commentator has observed, demonizing the perpetrators of crime in these ways
helps to simplify the difficult task of assigning moral blame
and to "condemn beyond what is deserved," the paradigmatic
case of a wrongful condemnation. 45 To be sure, persons perceived as fundamentally different from us are easier to hurt
and, in an ultimate sense, to condemn to death. When the media exaggerate and essentialize apparent differences between
criminal defendants and the rest of society, they increase the
temptation "to ignore moral complexities [inherent in the process of judging another] and declare the person and his act entirely evil."46 Too often, the media encourage us to "assign the
offender the mythic role of Monster, a move which justifies
harsh treatment and insulates us from moral concerns about
the suffering we inflict."47
Moreover, as I have emphasized, deciding whether to impose the death penalty is a normative, value-laden process.
Unlike the determination of factual guilt, it is not anchored in
the physical universe. Thus, the judgment about whether
someone deserves death is especially vulnerable to these biasing psychological influences, which, in turn, increases the frequency with which miscarriages of justice occur.
In addition to the demonizing of criminals as part of a general framework for understanding crime-and-punishment issues, the media can create many case-specific biases. Because
death penalty cases involve serious violent crimes, they gener44Id. at 142.
45 Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 692 (1989) [hereinafter Pillsbury].

46Id.
47 See Pillsbury, supra note 45, at 692; KATHRYN GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC
MIND 163 (University of Michigan Press 1995) (arguing that the punitive consensus
that came to dominate public attitudes towards crime and punishment by the mid·
1990s could be explained in large part by an inability to empathize or to perceive commonalities with persons who had committed crimes and to view them instead as having
moved "beyond the pale.")
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ate high levels of community interest and heightened attention
from the local media and law enforcement officials. Commentators have cited the fact that capital cases often involve "high
profile crimes that attract enormous media attention" as one of
the important factors that contributes to "high error rates in
convicting and sentencing innocent people to death row."48
The publicity that surrounds a particular death penalty
case puts enormous pressure on the police to find a culprit and
on prosecutors to gain a conviction and death sentence. As one
prosecutor acknowledged, "[t]he pressure on the District Attorney is particularly great in a high profile case, a homicide or
multiple homicide so grievous and so aggravated that there is a
hue and cry and a determination to pursue capital punishment."49 Certain kinds of cases "can fever a community, large
or small, particularly if there's agitated press about it."50
But there are various additional ways that the media can
contribute to the erroneous attribution of legal and moral guilt.
Indeed, local news coverage of specific capital cases typically is
slanted in such a way that it compounds pre-existing, general
biases held by community residents. Much research indicates
that exposure to prejudicial pretrial publicity increases the
guilt-proneness of potential jurors, especially when specific
items of publicity are absorbed in memory. 51 In cases where
the media has decided that a particular defendant is guilty,
community members who have few if any other sources of information about the case, often come to share this view. 52 This
48 Alan W. Clarke et al., Executing the Innocent: The Next Step in the Marshall
Hypothesis, 26 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 309, 345 (2000-2001).
49 Michael McCann, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L.
REV. 117, 160-161 (2002).
50Id. McCann went on to acknowledge that "[tJhe handling of a high profile
capital punishment case resulting in a conviction and the execution of the defendant
appears, at least to some prosecutors, as an attractive way to advance their political
interests." Id. at 161.
51 See, e.g., E. Constanti & J. King, The Partial Juror: Correlates and Causes of
Prejudgment, 15 LAw AND SOC'y REV_ 9 (1980); Craig Haney & H. Fukurai, Indifferent
as They Stand Unsworn?: Pretrial Publicity, Fairness, and the Capital Jury, (2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); N. Steblay et aI., The Effects of Pretrial
Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 219
(1999); Christina Studebaker & Steven Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: The Media, Law,
and Commonsense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUR POL'y & L. 428 (1997).
52 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 33 at 494. Jurors in highly publicized cases "may
have seen or heard or read police officers or other government officials declare the defendant guilty. They may have witnessed or felt a general sense of communal outrage.
All this will make them more likely to convict. _. . As a result, the records of erroneous
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is another way in which prejudicial or inflammatory publicity
contributes to factually innocent persons being convicted of
crimes they did not commit.
In addition, however, news reporting can bias the judgments that people make about a defendant's evil intent or
blameworthy state of mind, as well as his moral guilt and overall culpability. For example, in a study Susan Greene and I did
of the newspaper reporting in a large sample of capital cases,
we found that the press focused intensely on the gruesome details of the crimes, left little doubt about who was fully responsible for having committed them, and contained extremely
negative characterizations of defendants. 53 Moreover, most of
this incriminating "information" was provided by seemingly
credible sources-law enforcement and prosecutors.54
The articles often repeated descriptions of defendants that
essentialized their identity as a criminal, such as "thrill killer,"
"career criminal," "escapee," "fugitive," "inmate," or "serial date
rapist."55 In many cases, the sensationalized details of the
crime became the defendant's one-dimensional social identitya total description of his personhood-as though he had no potentially humanizing life experiences outside of his criminal
behavior. Thus, one defendant was described as having "the
street cunning of a longtime criminal,"56 and another was reported to commit crimes "for the thrill and sense of power,"57
both in advance of their trials.
The stories provided readers with little or no real understanding of the social historical and structural causes of the
crime, and no sense of how the defendant's past experiences
and background factors may have contributed to his behavior.
The amount of attention given to the crime itself, and the way

convictions include scores of cases in which publicity and public outrage clearly contributed to the error .... " [d.
53 Craig Haney & Susan Greene, Capital Constructions: Newspaper Reporting in
Death Penalty Cases, 4 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'y 1, 129-50 (2004) [hereinafter Haney & Greene].
54 See Haney & Greene, supra note 53; Marla Sandys & Steven M. Chermak, A
Journey into the Unknown: Pretrial Publicity and Capital Cases, 1 COMM. L. & POL'y
533 (1996).
55 See Haney & Greene, supra note 53.
56 Street Smart Escapee Knows Tricks of Eluding Team of Pursuing Lawmen, L.
A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at B1.
57 "Gone Bad" Cop Wanted in Killing at Grocery Store, S. F. EXAMINER, Aug. 21,
1994, at C3.
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its most dramatic or heinous features were so often repeated,
were likely to evoke feelings of anger and outrage in the community. Of course, there is only one obvious target at which
these feelings can be directed-the (necessarily) unsympathetic
defendant. Among other things, this lack of coverage regarding
a defendant's personal history, "serves to deny the humanity of
the persons who commit capital murder, substituting the heinousness of their crimes for the reality of their personhood."58
Indeed, a profile of the typical capital defendant is constructed by the media, one in which he appears to have functioned throughout his life as an otherwise fully autonomous
agent making willfully blameworthy choices, presumably from
a range otherwise attractive or desirable options, which have
resulted in a pattern of incorrigible, violent criminality. The
"media model" of violent criminality leads inexorably to the
conclusion that each individual defendant has "freely" committed the violent act in question and, therefore, is solely responsible, completely morally blameworthy, and entirely deserving
of the sentence imposed upon him.
Obviously, case-specific publicity that reinforces this view
gives community residents and potential jurors a perspective
on a particular capital defendant that favors the death penalty
in his or her case. In addition, media coverage of capital cases
focuses far more extensively on aggravation than mitigation. 59
However, the omitted or under-reported information-the mitigating background and social histories of capital defendantsis a major part of what capital juries are supposed to consider
and take into account in their assessment of moral guilt or culpability. In most cases it will be the only thing they can use as
the basis for a life rather than a death sentence. In contrast,
unlike aggravating factors with which the media typically inundates potential jurors, people are unlikely to encounter any
mention or description of mitigating factors until the trial itself.

Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder, supra note 32, at 547.
See Haney & Greene, supra note 53, at 142. The disproportion is extreme.
For example, Greene and I found that there were about 4.5 aggravating facts for every
one mitigating fact that was reported in the newspaper stories we analyzed. The ratio
did not vary much for cases that resulted in death (where aggravation would be expected to outweigh mitigation and therefore be covered more extensively) as opposed to
those that resulted in life (where mitigation would be expected to outweigh aggravation
and be more often reported). Id.
58
59
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The one-sided media model of capital crime may help to
explain another problematic feature of our system of death sentencing that may contribute to the rendering of death rather
than life verdicts. Although I discuss it in greater detail below,
it is worth noting briefly here as well. The all-important capital sentencing instructions that are supposed to govern jury decision-making in death penalty cases are very poorly understood overall. However, research shows that the errors in
comprehension are not evenly distributed and that the term
"mitigation" is the most poorly understood of the core concepts
on which jurors are supposed to rely.60 The fact that news reports of capital cases omit nearly all mention of this kind of
mitigation means that few people will enter a death penalty
trial with a pre-existing "framework of understanding" that includes the mitigating significance of background social history
information. Because of the one-sided crime focus of the news
reporting, the task of even identifying such information, let
alone understanding its relevance to determinations of blameworthiness and knowing how to take it into account in deciding
on a defendant's life or death sentence, may be so foreign and
unfamiliar that jurors are uncertain about whether and how to
do it. The fact that the term "mitigation" is so poorly understood in the capital sentencing instructions may be a reflection
of these inter-related problems. But it underscores an additional fact: the instructions themselves cannot be relied upon to
remedy these problems.
B.

JURy-RELATED FACTORS: IGNORING BIAS AND INCREASING
DEATH PRONENESS

In part because of the high levels of publicity that surround them, capital cases present a special set of jury-related
issues and problems that can contribute to capital defendants
being wrongfully condemned. In some instances, miscarriages
60 See, e.g., S. Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, and Judges,
48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 423 (1993); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993); Craig Haney
& Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of Caiifornia's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 411 (1994); Craig Haney
& Mona Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional Comprehension and Penalty Phase Arguments, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 575 (1997); R. Wiener et aI., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80
J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 455 (1995).
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of justice are likely to occur because of the legal system's failure to address these problems. In other instances, however,
the problems are of the system's own creation.
As I have noted, the media rarely depict capital crimes, defendants, and trials in balanced and complex ways that fully
inform citizens and potential jurors about the range of issues
they should consider and reflect on before deciding whether to
sentence someone to die. The legal system itself does little to
address this problem and actually may compound it. For example, the law allows parties to request a change of venue
when they believe there is a risk that the community from
which the jury pool will be drawn has been tainted by prejudicial pretrial publicity. Although the legal doctrines vary
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, they generally require a showing of a "reasonable likelihood" that a fair and impartial jury cannot be impaneled there. 61 Unfortunately, despite the existence of this potentially effective legal remedy for
publicity-related pretrial bias, courts are extremely reluctant to
change venue, even in capital cases. 62 As one legal commentator correctly observed, among the possible remedies for prejudicial pretrial publicity, "[c]hange of venue motions, above all
others, are under-utilized by trial judges."63 As a result, many
61 ''Reasonable likelihood that a fair trial cannot be had" is the standard en·
dorsed by the American Bar Association. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Standards Relating to
Fair Trial and Free Press § 8·3.3 (c) (1980). For two useful discussions of these issues
see Peter D. O'Connell, Pretrial Publicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls: A
Theory of Procedural Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 169, 197 (1988), and Michael Jacob
Whellan, What's Happened to Due Process Among the States? Pretrial Publicity and
Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 193
(1990).
62 Among other things, the added costs of conducting a trial away from the jurisdiction where most of the trial participants reside means that changes of venue are expensive to undertake. This is especially true in capital cases, where the length and
complexity of the trial itself tend to be much greater. Moreover, highly publicized capital cases often are highly politicized as well, placing "elected trial judges under considerable pressure not to ... change venue." Stephen Bright & Patrick Keenan, Judges

and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in
Capital Cases, 75 B. U. L. REV. 759, 766 (1995). Thus, in those cases where community
sentiments run highest, precisely the ones for which changes of venue are most needed,
the political risks, especially to elected trial judges, are greatest. [d.
63 Joseph Mariniello, The Death Penalty and Pre-trial Publicity: Are Today's Attempts at Guaranteeing a Fair Trial Adequate?, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'y 371, 376 (1994). Similarly, psychologists Michael Nietzel and Ronald Dillehay
have noted that, despite its effectiveness, "courts are reluctant to change venue because of the expense, the inconvenience, and the tradition that justice should be administered in the coinmunity where the crime occurred." MICHAEL NIETZEL & RONALD
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capital cases go to trial in communities that have been saturated with publicity that contains extremely prejudicial characterizations of defendants and damaging case-related information. 64
Thus, case-related publicity not only puts pressure on law
enforcement and prosecutors to secure a conviction in ·capital
cases but also increases the likelihood that defendants in death
penalty cases will face jurors who harbor case-specific biases
and prejudices against them. Denying a change of venue motion in a highly publicized capital case can heighten the
chances of conviction and increase the likelihood that a death
sentence will be imposed. Of course, a death sentence arrived
at for this reason-a capital defendant sentenced to die who
would have been given life by a jury chosen from another venue
that was not exposed to such damaging pretrial publicityrepresents a serious miscarriage of justice.
Jury selection or voir dire is the other legal remedy available to address pretrial bias. Unfortunately, it is of limited
value in many highly publicized cases. 65 Typical voir dire quesDILLEHAY, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION IN THE COURTROOM 68 (pergamon 1986).
64 Courtney Mullin, The Jury System in Death Penalty Cases: A Symbolic Gesture, 43 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 142 (1980). Especially in small venues, "[t]he
community demands justice and exerts tremendous pressure on the judge to keep the
murder trial within its sphere of influence . . .. Since the change of venue is discretionary with the judge, is costly in terms of time and money, and is not customarily
granted, most judges opt to deny the motion .... " Id.
65 For example, in theory, jury selection, where attorneys and judges have an
opportunity to identify and excuse those persons who may be tainted by negative caserelated publicity, should help to insure the fair-mindedness of the jury that remains.
In many highly publicized capital cases, however, jury selection procedures fall far
short of realizing this potential. Among other things, research has shown that although potential jurors may be cognizant of having been exposed to negative pretrial
publicity (indeed, publicity that typically has led them to develop a prejudicial opinion
of the defendant), they still tend to claim impartiality. G. Moran & B. L. Cutler, The
Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity, 21 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345-367
(1991). Moreover, even those persons who claim not to be influenced by negative pretrial publicity nonetheless are more likely to convict the defendant than those exposed
to neutral publicity. See, e.g., Norber L. Kerr et aI., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in
Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 665 (1991); S. Sue et ai., Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 163 (1974); S. Sue et ai., Authoritarianism, Pretrial Publicity
and Awareness of Bias in Simulated Jurors, 37 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 1299 (1975);
W. C. Thompson et ai., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453 (1981). Research also indicates that despite attempts to ask jurors about the influence of pretrial publicity in voir dire, those who disclaim any bias are still more inclined to be punitive toward the defendant. See Hedy
Dexter et ai., A Test of Voir Dire as a Remedy for the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Pub-
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tions require prospective jurors to make difficult selfassessments and subtle predictions about themselves: Can you
be fair? Are you able to set aside whatever you may have read
and heard about the case? Will you base your verdict entirely
on the evidence and instructions you receive in court? Few
people honestly know whether they are genuinely capable of
these things, and few want to admit to being closed minded,
unwilling to listen, or reluctant to follow orders from a judge.
Fewer still will depict themselves as persons inclined to render
unfair and biased verdicts. 66
Moreover, because capital cases require jurors to assess
moral guilt as the basis for a decision about the appropriateness of the death penalty, publicity-related bias is not restricted to the issue on which voir dire is usually focused:
whether someone is predisposed with respect to factual or legal
guilt. Thus, prospective jurors who have become familiar with
the consequences of the crime for the larger community (so that
they feel pressure to impose the harshest punishment on the
community's behalf), or who may know legally inadmissible details about the defendant's past life (so that they begin their
assessment of case-related evidence with a store of negative information that might be used as extra-legal aggravation), or
have seen or heard opinions expressed about the defendant's
moral turpitude or unsavory character (that conform to their
licity, 22 J. OF APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 819 (1992). Finally, studies suggest that judicial admonitions or instructions to ignore pretrial publicity generally fail to reduce its
biasing effects. See, e.g., S. Fein et aI., Can the jury disregard that information? The
use of suspicion to reduce the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity and inadmissible
testimony, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 1215 (1997); G. P. Kramer et aI.,
Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 409
(1990); S. Sue et aI., Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. OF
CRIM. JUST. 163 (1974).
66 For example, in an observation and interview study that Cathy Johnson and I
did, we found that jurors were able to survive the voir dire process and sit on felony
juries even though they held opinions that were at odds with basic tenets of American
jurisprudence (such as presumption of innocence), and had been asked about these very
things during jury selection. Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content and Effect, 18 LAw AND HUM. BEHAV. 487 (1994) [hereinafter Johnson & Haney]. Specifically, nearly half of the actual jurors in several felony
cases said in post-trial interviews that they had not been able to "set aside" their personal opinions and beliefs even though they had agreed, during jury selection, to do so.
Id. Another study that relied on post-trial interviews of persons who sat on criminal
cases estimated that between one quarter to nearly one third of jurors were not candid
and forthcoming in accurately and fully answering questions posed during the voir dire
process. R. Seltzer et aI., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 451
(1991).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss1/6

22

Haney: Injustice in Death Penalty Cases

2006]

INJUSTICE IN DEATH PENALTY CASES

153

pre-existing stereotype about irredeemably violent and vicious
criminals) are biased in ways that may prove literally fatal to a
capital defendant. Even though these publicity-related biases
can profoundly affect the judgments that capital jurors may be
called upon to make about culpability and moral guilt, the effects are extremely difficult to uncover in the course of jury selection. In any event, prospective jurors are rarely questioned
about these things. Moreover, few people are willing and able
to give accurate, candid answers about whether they have
formed such complex, subtle, and deep-seated judgments.
In fact, voir dire is conducted in capital cases in a way that
increases rather than decreases the likelihood that flawed determinations of factual, legal, and moral guilt will occur. In
addition to the failure of voir dire to effectively reduce or eliminate publicity-created biases, jury selection in death penalty
cases suffers from a unique and serious problem that contributes to capital defendants being wrongfully convicted as well as
wrongfully condemned. Death qualification is an anomalous
feature of the capital trial process; it requires penalty to be discussed with jurors at the outset of the case, before any evidence
has been presented and long before penalty is relevant. The attention of prospective jurors is drawn away from the presumption of innocence and onto what will happen after they have
convicted the defendant.
This anomaly is structural, built into the very nature of
the capital process, and it operates to increase the likelihood
that miscarriages of justice will occur. As one legal commentator put it, "[d]eath qualification as currently practiced tilts the
jury first towards guilt and then towards death, both by removing too many of certain kinds of people from the pool, and by affecting the expectations and perceptions of those who reMuch has been made of the way that death
main."67
67 Susan Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death
Qualification, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 699 (2002). Similarly, two social science reo
searchers concluded: "At all stages of the trial-jury selection, determination of guilt or
innocence, and the final judgment of whether the defendant lives or dies-death qualification results in bias against the capital defendant of a nature that occurs for no
other criminal defendant." James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital
Trials, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 279 (1988) [hereinafter Luginbuhl & Middendorf].
For an excellent overview see William Thompson, Death Qualification after Wainwright
V. Witt and Lockhart V. McCree, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1989). See also Craig
Haney (Ed.), Special Issue on Death Qualification, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1984), and
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qualification creates guilt-prone capital juries, and rightly so.
This practice undoubtedly contributes to wrongful convictions
in capital cases. Death-qualified juries are more likely to endorse a crime control rather than due process perspective on
criminal justice issues, so they begin a capital case tending to
side more with the prosecution than the defense. 68 They tend
to deliberate less vigorously and effectively than more demographically and attitudinally diverse juries (i.e., the kind of jury
that sits in other kinds of criminal cases).69 In addition, deathqualified juries are exposed to a process that implies that the
defendant is guilty. Research indicates that otherwise premature questions about penalty lead them to make precisely that
inference, adding to the predisposition to convict and, in turn,
making a wrongful conviction more likely.70
However, death qualification also appears to increase the
chances that juries will wrongfully attribute legal and moral
guilt to capital defendants. For example, we know that, all
other things being equal, death-qualified juries are less likely
to accept the insanity defense and more likely to endorse the
view that it is a "loophole" that allows too many guilty persons
to go free.71 Moreover, because death-qualified jurors are more
likely to reject mental health defenses, they may be left more
susceptible to what I have termed the "media model" of will-

the various articles contained therein.
68 See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) [hereinafter Fitzgerald & Ellsworth]; William Thompson et aI., Death Penalty Attitudes and
Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
95 (1984); Edward Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the
Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV.
1 (1970); Edward Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases
Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from California, 3 WOODROW
WILSON J. OF LAw 11 (1980).
69 Claudia Cowan, William Thompson & Phoebe Ellsworth, The Effects of Death
Qualification and Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984). As a meta-analysis of studies done through the late 1990s
concluded: "The results indicate that the more a person favors the death penalty, the
more likely that person is to vote to convict a defendant." Mike Allen et aI., Impact of
Juror Attitudes about the Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 715 (1998).
70 Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of Death
Qualification, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984); Craig Haney, Examining Death
Qualification: Further Analysis of the Process Effect, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984).
71 Phoebe Ellsworth et aI., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity,
8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984); see also Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 68, at 43.
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fully violent criminality.72 That is, they may be predisposed to
attribute blameworthy states of mind to capital defendants, especially in cases where the defense presents evidence that
mental illness or emotional disturbance has clouded the defendant's judgment or impaired his ability to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.
The final biasing effect that skews the verdicts rendered by
persons eligible to sit on capital juries is an obvious one: death
qualification facilitates death sentences by insuring that the
only jurors allowed to decide whether a capital defendant lives
or dies have been selected on the basis of their willingness to
vote for death. 73 Of course, a group selected on this basis is
more likely to actually impose the death penalty than one selected through non-death qualifying voir dire. 74 Thus, deathqualified jurors are more likely to favor the death penalty in
general, and are also more likely to believe that it furthers important societal goals in a legally proper way (for example, to
believe incorrectly that it deters murder and is administered
fairly and reliably).
Death-qualified jurors also weigh and evaluate penalty
phase evidence differently. Specifically, they are more likely to
endorse numerous aggravating factors while diminishing the
significance of both statutory and non-statutory mitigation. 75
72 This not only makes them more likely to attribute intent in situations where it
may be lacking, but also, to the extent they see the defendant as having psychopathic
rather than psychotic traits, more likely to impose the death penalty. See John Edens
et aI., The Impact of Mental Health Evidence on Support for Capital Punishment: Are
Defendants Labeled Psychopathic Considered More Deserving of Death?, 23 BEHAV. SCI.
& LAw 603 (2005).
73 Strictly speaking, since Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) was decided,
capital jurors also are supposed to be selected on the basis of their willingness to vote
for life. However, most commentators believe that so-called "life qualification" is not
strictly adhered to or effectively practiced by the courts and that many "automatic
death penalty jurors" manage to serve on capital juries. Thus: "The starkest failure of
capital voir dire is the qualification of jurors who will automatically impose the death
penalty ('ADP jurors') regardless of the individual circumstances of the case." John H.
Blume et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1209, 1220 (2001).
74 This commonsense relationship has been supported in a number of studies.
For one of the early ones, see George Stricker & George Jurow, The Relationship Between Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment and Assignment of the Death Penalty, 2 J.
OF PSYCHIATRY & LAw 415 (1974).
75 See Brooke Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death Qualification in Venirepersons' Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials,
26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 175 (2002); Haney, Hurtado, & Vega, supra note 38; Luginbuhl
& Middendorf, supra note 67.
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In addition, the process of death qualification has a direct impact on the death sentencing behavior of capital jurors. Among
other things, exposure to death qualification convinces jurors
that the major trial participants favor capital punishment, desensitizes them to the imposition of the death penalty, labels
the case and the defendant as potentially "death-worthy" before
any evidence has been presented, and requires the jurors to
publicly affirm their willingness to impose the death penalty
(which likely increases their commitment to doing precisely
that). 76
In each instance, capital jury decisions are being made by
a carefully screened group of people whose demographic and
attitudinal characteristics mean they are more in favor capital
punishment. These same people likely have been changed by
the process of screening in ways that lead them to impose
death more often. Thus, death qualification makes wrongful
condemnations more likely. These miscarriages of justice are
not easy to definitively identify. Yet the available evidence
suggests that they are not infrequent.
C.

TRIAL STRUCTURE, PROCESS, AND CONTENT: TILTING THE
JURY TOWARD DEATH VERDICTS

The nature and content of the capital trial process contribute to what has been termed the "moral disengagement" of
capital jurors. 77 Moral disengagement means that the psychological barriers against taking the life of another are lowered
by virtue of the practices and procedures that distance decision-makers from the human consequences of their decision. 78
In a death penalty case, the morally distancing features of the
process include the structure of the trial and the sequencing of
the evidence that is presented in the guilt phase of the trial.
Specifically, there is a virtually exclusive focus on crime76

These processes are described at greater length in HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN,

supra note 11, at Chapter 6, and Johnson & Haney, supra note 66.
77 I discuss these issues at greater length in Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death,
49 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1997). The term "moral disengagement" is Albert Bandura's.
See Albert Bandura, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM:
PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 161 (W. Reich ed., 1989);
Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action, in HANDBOOK
OF MORAL BEHAVIOR AND DEVELOPMENT 45 (W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz eds., 1991).
78 Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury, supra note 77, at 1449.
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related evidence and correspondingly minimal attention given
to the personhood of the accused. This is followed by exclusively crime-related aggravating evidence in the penalty phase.
Typically, only then is the presentation of contextualizing, social historical information about the defendant possible.
This means that evidence and testimony that is likely to
have a morally disengaging effect on jurors-evidence that encourages them to dehumanize the defendant and to distance
themselves from him as a person--occurs first and cannot be
effectively addressed or rebutted until the very last stage of the
trial. We know that dehumanization operates to cognitively
distance people from the moral implications of their actions. 79
For example, as Tom Tyler has noted, dehumanization "prevents the moral issues which are normally raised when harm is
being done to other human beings from being raised in a particular instance."8o Whatever else dehumanization accomplishes in this context, it is likely to facilitate death sentencing
(including imposing death sentences on persons who do not deserve to receive).
Some of the moral disengagement that facilitates death
sentencing also derives from the formal, legalistic atmosphere
of the trial itself, and some from legal doctrines that prohibit
jurors from learning about certain issues that might balance
the moral equation with which they are presumably working.
For example, as one legal commentator has noted, "the emotional, physical, and experiential aspects of being human have
by and large been banished from the better legal neighborhoods
and from explicit recognition in legal discourse ...."81 Another
acknowledged that the courtroom setting is "hardly intimate or
otherwise conducive to 'knowing' someone" and that anyone
who advocates the empathetic understanding of a defendant in
a legal proceeding "must favor radical restructuring of court

79 See, e.g., Bandura, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement, supra note 77; Bandura, Social Cognitive Thoery of Moral Thought and Action, supra note 77; Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood & Michael Fromson, Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims, 9 J. OF RESEARCH IN
PERSONALITY 253 (1975); Philip Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason,
Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON
MOTIVATION 237-309 (W. Arnold & D. Levine eds., 1969).
80 Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Authority; Why Do People Obey an Order
to Harm Others?, 24 LAw & SOC'y REV. 1089, 1093 (1990).
81 Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1575 (1987).
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procedures to make them more congenial" to such things.82
Although these are normative statements about legal language and proceedings in general, they are particularly problematic-and indeed may be fatal-in a capital case. Because
jurors have to make a moral assessment of the defendant's
overall culpability, one that requires them to empathically
"know" someone (and his or her life history) if they are to truly
do justice, anything that drives the jury farther away from the
defendant can lead to a death sentence being wrongly imposed.
As Samuel Pillsbury has pointed out, "[t]he question of what
punishment an offender deserves requires a complex factual
and moral evaluation. . .. [I]f accuracy in desert evaluation is
paramount, as it is in the capital context, we must adopt a
broad view of culpability that defies encapsulation in rules."83
Although, in general terms, "[l]egal decisions and lawmaking
frequently have nothing to do with understanding human experiences, affect, suffering-how people do live,"84 the law's
tendency to disengage us from these issues in capital penalty
trials can have fatal consequences.
Moreover, there is an asymmetry to the kind of information that capital jurors can receive that tends to increase levels
of moral disengagement. Specifically, the viewing of the defendant's violence, showing the jurors the capital crime in graphic
and gruesome detail, has become routine in the guilt phase of
these cases. In addition, the Supreme Court has sanctioned
the use of so called victim-impact testimony in capital penalty
trials, authorizing prosecutors to go even farther by presenting
capital jurors with the full range of terrible consequences that
the defendant's violence has brought about, regardless of
whether those consequences were intended or foreseeable.
They now routinely explore the myriad dimensions of grief and
loss and longing that the defendant's violence has produced. 85
82 Toni Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2108 (1989).
83 Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 669 (1989).
84 Lynne Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1574-1575
(1987) (emphasis added).
85 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (authorizing the use of "victim
impact" testimony in capital penalty trials). The practice remains controversial for a
variety of reasons, including the fact that it holds persons accountable and morally
blameworthy for consequences that they did not specifically intend and could not have
reasonably foreseen. Nonetheless, the use of victim impact testimony in capital cases is
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However, the law systematically and explicitly prevents capital
jurors from learning anything comparable about the nature
and consequences of the state's violence-the execution that
they are being asked to authorize. 86
Thus, the consequences of the defendant's violence are
made highly salient, sometimes through the use of narrative
devices that are so richly, comprehensively, and graphically detailed that they easily become the most compelling, wrenching
part of the trial. On the other hand, the consequences of the
violence in which the capital jury is being asked to directly participate are minimized, hidden from view, sanitized, or treated
in a way that implies that other decisionmakers (at later stages
in the process) will be responsible for bringing them about. 87
Jurors disengaged in these ways from the consequences of the
death verdicts they are being asked to authorize are more
likely to render them. They are also more likely to render them
erroneously (that is, to return death verdicts when, in fact,
they would have voted for life if they had been better and more
fully informed).
Another aspect of the capital trial process also has the potential to increase the number of times a capital defendant is
wrongfully condemned. In the 1976 decisions in which the U.S.
Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty, it confidently endorsed a set of statutory reforms that relied heavily on judicial
instructions to regularize and rationalize the death sentencing
process. 88 The basic notion, as expressed in these early, landnow widespread.
86 For example, in one California case the state supreme court ruled unequivo·
cally that "[e]vidence of how the death penalty will be performed, as well as the nature
and quality of life for one imprisoned for life without he possibility of parole, is properly
excluded" from the jury's consideration." People v. Fudge, 7 Cal. 4th 1075, 1117 (1994).
In this case and others, these assertions come without any underlying analysis or rea·
soning; they simply are part of a broader rule that the nature of the punishment itself
is "not relevant to any issue material to the choice of penalty." Id. at 1124.
87 See, e.g., Joseph Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-·Juror Misperception of Sentenc·
ing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995).
88 A series of state death penalty statutes passed in the aftermath of Furman
were evaluated in opinions issued simultaneously by the Court in its 1976 Term. The
lead case, Gregg u. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), approved of Georgia's new death pen·
alty statute in which a judge or jury was required to find at least one aggravating cir·
cumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and then to consider other aggravating and
mitigating circumstances before sentencing a defendant to death. In Proffitt u. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976), the Court similarly approved the new Florida death penalty stat·
ute in which, following a jury's "advisory" verdict, a judge was required to weigh aggra·
vating against mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty should be
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mark cases, was that the previously "unbridled" discretion of
capital jurors could be brought under control by having judges
provide them with a list of factors or issues that they should
think about, consider, and use in certain specified ways in
making the choice between life and death. 89
There is now much reason to believe that the Court's
"guided discretion" model was advanced with far too much optimism, long before its supposed curative effects had been demonstrated. In fact, a number of studies, including ones conducted shortly after the new sentencing models were
implemented in the mid- to late 1970s, demonstrated that
many of the very same problems that plagued the earlier "arbitrary and capricious" and potentially discriminatory system
remained. 90 Among other things, these standard penalty phase
instructions are so difficult for average people to understand
and apply that many jurors simply are unable to comprehend
their most basic features. This instructional confusion begins
with the concepts of aggravation and, especially, mitigation,
and extends to uncertainty about which of the specific factors
should tip the scales in the direction life or death. The errors
are fundamental, they are made frequently, and there is no
evidence that they are corrected in the course of jury deliberation. As a result, there is no assurance that the death sentencing process that is supposed to be governed by this process results in fair, accurate, and reliable verdicts.
Moreover, there is a significant one-sidedness to the jurors'
confusion. On the one hand, the kind of evidence that typically
imposed. The Court approved a very different kind of death penalty statute in Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), examining the new Texas death penalty statute that required capital jurors to answer three questions affirmatively before sentencing him to
death: first, whether the defendant's homicidal act was intentional; second, whether it
was not a reasonable response to provocation; and third, whether there was a probability that the defendant would commit future acts of violence constituting a continuing
threat to society.
89 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249-51; Jurek, 428 U.S. at
274-77.
90 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et aI., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
LEGAL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (Northeastern University Press 1990); William J. Bowers
& Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured Discretion,
Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty: The First Decade After Furman in Texas, 69 SOC.
SCI. Q. 853 (1988); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The
Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
754 (1983); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The
Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981).
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makes up the bulk of a case in aggravation (the facts of the
crime, prior criminal acts, victim accounts of pain and loss) are
things that tend to be socially agreed upon as increasing the
severity of whatever punishment is deserved. They make
death verdicts more likely and are not only socially agreed
upon but the better understood of the two key terms in the instruction. On the other hand, the kind of evidence that makes
up the typical case in mitigation is significantly undermined by
the jurors' inability to understand the concept itself. Every
study on the topic confirms that it is poorly comprehended by a
significant number of participants, including potential and actual jurors. In addition, even when jurors do understand the
concept in the abstract, they tend to associate it with crimerelated factors that rarely are presented by the defense in a
capital penalty phase. 91 Jurors who can understand and apply
aggravation, but who do not understand and cannot apply
mitigation are likely to wrongly condemn a capital defendant
out of sheer ignorance and confusion, rather than any careful
and reliable "moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant."92
In addition, by couching the jury's life-and-death decision
in terms that imply that some kind of legal formula is driving
the sentencing verdict, the instructions may remove or undermine the jurors' collective and individual sense of moral responsibility. Thus, at this very final stage,the process leaves
some jurors with a feeling that they are being compelled to
reach a death verdict that does not reflect their personal views.
By disengaging critical ethical concerns and deep moral considerations in this way, fo~mulaic death sentencing and instructions that appear to allow or even encourage jurors to relinquish personal responsibility may also contribute to wrongful
condemnations.

D. LETHAL LAWYERING: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND THE
ATTRIBUTION OF MORAL GUILT

There is one final way in which the nature of the capital
trial may contribute to the dehumanization of the defendant,
91 See, e.g., James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of Judges' Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 203 (1992).
92 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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morally disengage jurors from the decision before them, and
lead them to wrongfully condemn someone to die. A capital
penalty phase presents defense attorneys with a special challenge-to explain their client's life course and contextualize his
behavior in terms of his social history and present circumstances. Defense attorneys are unlikely to have encountered
such a challenge in any other kind of case. Yet, it they fail to
effectively meet it, there is a high probability that the jury that
sits in final judgment of their client will be denied the essential
information needed to render a fair and reliable sentence.
The challenge itself is rooted in deep-seated psychological
tendencies. Social psychologists have written extensively about
the way observers attribute the causes of behavior to the internal states and traits of the persons who perform it, even when
other, more external causes may be responsible. 93 This common tendency is termed the "fundamental attribution error."
In a legal context, of course, it may lead jurors to attribute intentionality and blameworthy states of mind to a criminal defendant, even when situational forces have contributed to, and
help to account for, the criminal act that they are called upon
to judge. 94 This may contribute to one kind of miscarriage of
justice that I described earlier, wherein jurors attribute more
culpable states of mind to criminal defendants than the evidence in their case otherwise warrants. 95
Although the tendency to commit the fundamental attribution error is widespread and may occur whenever observers
make judgments about the actions of others, certain factors
make this erroneous allocation of legal responsibility more
likely. For example, all other things being equal, the greater
the harm that the particular behavior brings about, the more
likely that it will be attributed to internal causes (i.e., to the

93 See Lee Hamilton, Intuitive Psychologist or Intuitive Lawyer? Alternative Models of the Attribution Process, 39 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 767 (1980);
Joel Johnson et aI., Causal Attribution and Dispositional Inference: Evidence of Inconsistent Judgments, 20 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 567 (1984); LEE ROSS &

RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (McGraw-Hill 1991).
94 See, e.g., Eric Hansen, Charles Kimble, & David Biers, Actors and Observers:
Divergent Attributions of Constrained Unfriendly Behavior, 29 SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 87 (2001); Martin Safer, Attributing Evil to the Subject, Not the Situation, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 205 (1980).
95 See supra notes 33·60 and accompanying text.
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perpetrator of the act).96 In addition, the less similar the person whose behavior is being judged to the person making the
judgment, the greater the tendency to perceive internal causes
for the behavior, to hold the actor more responsible and culpable for his actions, and to punish him more harshly. 97
When the defendant is a minority group member, it may
give rise to what has been termed the "ultimate attribution error", which in this context entails using racial differences as
the basis for assigning additional blame and meting out
harsher punishment. 98 In addition, stereotyped media messages about the "kind of people" who are likely to commit crime
also may increase the amount of responsibility and blame that
jurors will allocate to perpetrators. 99 This may change the nature of the moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant
in which a capital jury is supposed to engage, skew its view of
him, change jurors' assessment of his death worthiness, and
lower the threshold for imposing a death sentence.
To effectively rebut these tendencies in a case in mitigation, defense attorneys must humanize the defendant by contextualizing his behavior. That is, they should assist jurors in
overcoming their pre-existing stereotypes and expectations
about the internal and individualistic nature of violence. These
are precisely the stereotypes that are created and amplified by
the media coverage of death penalty cases and the various aspects of the capital trial process that I have referred to
above. loo
Yet, experienced capitallitigators and death penalty scholars have repeatedly warned that too many defense attorneys
lack the kind of training and professional experience that is
needed to find and develop this humanizing testimony.1 Ol In
addition, many of them are denied the time and resources it
96 See, e.g., Chimaeze Ugwuegbu & Clyde Hendrick, Personal Causality and Attribution of Responsibility, 2 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 76 (1974).
97 See, e.g. Curtis Banks, The Effects of Perceived Similarity Upon the Use of Reward and Punishment, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 131 (1976).
98 See, e.g., Thomas Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis' of Prejudice, in INTERGROUP RELATIONS: ESSENTIAL
READINGS. KEy READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 162-173 (Michael Hogg & Dominic

Abrams eds., 2001).
99 See Haney & Greene, supra note 53.
100 See supra notes 33-92 and accompanying text.
101 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835, 1851 (1994).
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would take to accomplish these tasks properly.lo2 As a result,
too little of this testimony is effectively gathered, prepared, or
presented in many penalty phase cases.l° 3 As one capital litigator summarized:
In the sentencing phase of these proceedings, defendants often find themselves represented by lawyers who have no experience in or knowledge about developing evidence of mental illness or other mitigating factors. In case after case, the
jury never hears that the defendant had an honorable military record and then developed post-traumatic stress disorder, or that the defendant had serious mental illness when
growing up but was never treated. 104

Indeed, two legal commentators concluded that "it is commonplace in many states for trial counsel to fail to present any
evidence or argument at all during the punishment phase of a
capital trial."105
In addition, defense attorneys in many jurisdictions are
overmatched and outspent by experienced prosecutors who
have the state's considerable resources at their disposal.1° 6
This disparity in resources increases the likelihood that wrongful condemnations will occur in death penalty cases. The disparity in resources amplifies a pre-existing advantage-the fact
that the prosecution's implicit and over arching theory in the
typical capital trial generally comports with stereotypic beliefs
Id. at 1854.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 680 (1990); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835
(1994); Stephen B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of
Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 MO. L. REV.
849 (1992); Richard H. Burr, Representing the Client on Death Row: The Politics of Advocacy, 59 UMKC. L. Rev. 1(1990); William Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital
Penalty Trial, 18 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273 (1991); Gary Goodpaster, The
Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L.
REV. 299 (1983); Ronald Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N. Y. U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 797
(1986).
104 Ronald Tabak, The Egregiously Unfair Implementation of Capital Punishment
in the United States, supra note 20, at 18.
105 Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355,
421 (1995) (emphasis added).
106 Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 101, at 1849.
102
103
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about crime and punishment held by citizens and jurors. That
is, the notion that the defendant's crime stems entirely from
his evil makeup, and that he therefore deserves to be judged
and punished exclusively on the basis of his presumably free,
morally blameworthy choices, is rooted in a longstanding cultural ethos. 107 As I have noted, the media has conditioned
many capital jurors to grant it uncritical and unquestioned acceptance. By providing causal explanations for the behavior of
others in largely dispositional or personal (as opposed to situational or contextual) terms, this ethos meshes perfectly with
the well-documented fundamental attribution error described
above. IDS
From a social psychological perspective, then, the defense
penalty phase presentation must somehow induce jurors to
temporarily suspend belief in a cultural ethos that many of
them regard as commonsense, and to correct the fundamental
attribution error by educating them about the historical, contextual, and situational determinants of the defendant's behavior. The prosecution's approach, on the other hand, is to embrace and build upon the jurors' pre-existing tendencies. As a
result, the average juror's intuitive understanding of behavior
is highly compatible with the basic terms of the typical prosecutorial narrative.
This means that defense attorneys have a much greater
educational burden to meet in capital penalty trials. They
must, in essence, overcome what many jurors already regard as
commonsense. When attorneys lack the significant training
and resources needed to properly find, assemble, and present
the available mitigation, they are unlikely to meet this burden.
As a result, many capital defendants will have their lives ended
by juries that were never given a chance to truly understand
them. Juries may remain morally disengaged when trial attorneys are unable-for lack of skill, effort, or resources-to· present humanizing, mitigating explanations for their client's behavior.
Among other things, then, the sheer legal and psychological complexity of capital cases, including the significant added

107 See, e.g., Craig Haney, Criminal Justice and the Nineteenth-Century Para·
digm: The Triumph of Psychological Individualism in the "Formative Era," 6 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 191 (1982).
108 See Luginbuhl, supra note 91, and the articles cited therein.
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burden of having to conduct an elaborate penalty trial and the
need to overcome the widespread but erroneous tendencies I
have discussed, greatly increase the demands that are placed
on defense attorneys. In this sense, the deficiencies in lawyering that plague capital representation generally and contribute
to wrongful convictions are even more likely to jeopardize the
outcome of capital penalty phases. These deficiencies contribute directly to death sentences being imposed in cases where,
had the trial attorney handled the penalty trial properly, a life
sentence would have resulted. As the authors of the American
Bar Association's proposal to critically examine the administration of the death penalty put it, "[i]t is scarcely surprising that
the results of poor lawyering are often literally fatal to capital
defendants."lo9
Finally, there is no reason to assume that the wrongful
condemnations that come about as a result of the various pretrial and trial-related problems I have described will necessarily be corrected in later stages of the case. Indeed, the poor
quality of legal representation at the trial level is replicated
and exacerbated in many states after a defendant is sentenced
to death. These post-conviction appeals are critically important because they are the only real opportunity to determine
whether mistakes or omissions may have contributed to the
outcome of the case. One experienced attorney described the
situation that still prevails in some parts of the country where
"states allow only a token fee of a few thousand dollars, or cap
expenses at about the same amount, or have no standards for
lawyer competence, or inflict all three plagues on the condemned. These states in fact deny any meaningful representation to men and women on death row."110

III. BEYOND FACTUAL INNOCENCE: ADDRESSING WRONGFUL
CONDEMNATIONS

Largely in response to the highly publicized exonerations
of many death-sentenced persons over the last several decades,
and the realization that there were many factually innocent
109 American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
Death Without Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of the Death Penalty
in the United States, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 487, 541 (2002).
lIO Elisabeth Semel, Representing Death Row Inmates at the Outskirts of the
Southern Front, 26 CACJ Forum 37, 40 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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persons who not only were convicted of serious crimes but also,
in the most extreme cases, were sentenced to die for them, a
number of commissions, organizations, and individuals promulgated guidelines and recommendations intended to achieve
the fair administration of the death penalty.111 These proposals are intelligent and important, and they go a long way toward insuring that many aspects of the system of death sentencing in the United States will be improved, becoming fairer
and more reliable. However, in part because these recommendations were prompted by wrongful convictions, most of them
are designed to improve what I have termed factual guilt determinations. In this section I discuss some of the reforms that
would need to be introduced to reduce or eliminate wrongful
condemnations.
Although it is difficult to provide reliable estimates of the
number of wrongful condemnations, there is reason to believe
that they are widespread, especially in .comparison to wrongful
convictions. For example, in describing the broken system of
capital punishment in the United States, James Liebman arid
his colleagues have shown that for every hundred death sentences meted out over a twenty-year period, some sixty-eight of
them were overturned because of "serious legal errors."112 On
retrial, eighty-two percent of those defendants were found not
to have deserved the death penalty and seven percent were
found to be not guilty of the offense for which they had been
convicted.1 13 Using this ration as a very rough estimate would
suggest that for every exoneration of a factually not guilty person, there may be more than ten times as many whose moral
guilt was erroneously assessed (that is, who were initially
wrongfully condemned).
I have discussed many of the standard policies and practices that operate in our system of capital punishment to morally distance citizens, voters, and jurors from the otherwise im-

111 See, e.g., Massachusetts Governor's Council on Capital Punishment, Final Report
(2004),
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/Agov2/docs/5-304%20MassDPReportFinaI.pdf (last visited Aug. 1,2006); Judge Leonard Sand & Danielle Rose, Proof Beyond All Possible Doubt: L~ There a Need for a Higher Burden of
Proof When the Sentence May Be Death? 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 135.9 (2003); J. Wilgoren,
fllinois Panel: Death Sentence Needs Overhaul, N. Y. TIMES, April 15, 2001, at AI, A19.
112 James Liebman et aI., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases. 19731995,78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1852 (2000).
113Id.
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possibly difficult psychological challenges with which death
sentencing presents them. Of course, as the process of death
sentencing unfolds in any given case, it is experienced by decision-makers as the sum of all of its interlocking parts, and
those parts operate in tandem to help facilitate the actual imposition of the death penalty. It is my belief that in reality the
death penalty functions as a complex social psychological network that creates a special set of reactions in those persons
who are exposed to and influenced by it. Those reactions are
what make the operation of the system possible and, in the final analysis, facilitate the imposition of the death penalty. For
this reason, systemic reforms are necessary to significantly improve the way the death penalty is implemented in the United
States. An overall revamping of this system is the only way to
make it truly fair, and to insure that wrongful condemnations
are rare or non-existent.
Thus, many aspects of the current system require fundamental change. For example, as I have noted, many citizens,
voters, and capital jurors rely primarily on the media for the
information about crime and punishment. 1l4 As a result, they
are mis-educated by what they see and hear. Thus, the media's
tendency to locate the causes of violent crime exclusively
within those persons who perpetrate it reinforces and exacerbates fundamental attribution error .. In addition, the risk of
victimization is exaggerated and the social contextual roots of
criminality typically ignored. As a result, exposure to the individualizing and sensationalized images of criminality that the
media typically project serves to heighten the audience's fear
not only of crime but also of the persons who commit it. In
general, this helps to shape the public's perspective on the need
for harsh punishment, including capital punishment.
The challenge of correcting media-related biases is a
daunting one. In addition to educational efforts aimed at making citizens more critical consumers of media messages, the
media can be encouraged and lobbied to rely on a broader
range of sources in their death penalty reporting. Law professor Susan Bandes observed that it also would require reporters
and news commentators to appreciate the fact that a particular
capital defendant "may have committed a crime worthy of punishment, but not of a death sentence," something she concedes
114

See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
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is presently "too nuanced to fit any recognizable dramatic category."115
On the other hand, although I have been highly critical of
the media, I also believe the media could become a part of the
solution for at least some of these problems. As one capital
litigator observed:
[It] takes the press to reach the public. If you can get the
press interested, you reach the court of public opinion. For
the many languishing on death row, whose trials did not attract press, appeal to that court is foreclosed. The miscarriage of justice in those cases, owing so often to inadequate
assistance of counsel, does not come to public notice. The resources at the command of the press for investigation of the
facts are not available to the accused .... 116

In addition, a more concerted effort would need to be made
to directly correct the collective media myths and store of misinformation that currently distorts the public's understanding
of capital punishment. James Coleman, head of an American
Bar Association committee that examined the fairness of capital punishment in the United States, reminded his colleagues,
"[a]s lawyers, public officials, and citizens, we have a responsibility to educate ourselves and to educate the public about the
administration of the death penalty and to take whatever actions each of us as individuals and all of us collectively can take
to make capital punishment and how it is administered fair
and unbiased."l17
Beyond public education, there are a variety of legal reforms that would be needed to significantly reduce or eliminate
wrongful condemnations in capital cases. For example, because of what research tells us about the way that exposure to
extensive pretrial publicity can prejudice the jury pool, the
change of venue criteria that judges currently apply in many
capital cases would need to be liberalized. That is, capital
cases especially should not go to trial in jurisdictions where
prospective jurors have been saturated with prejudicial public115 Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media in Covering and Shaping the
Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585, 588 (2004).
116 Eleanor Jackson Piel, The Death Row Brothers, 147 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM.

PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 30, 36 (2003).
117 James Coleman, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 117, 147-48 (2002).
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ity and as a result may hold beliefs and have formed conclusions that will compromise their ability to fairly decide the
case. Indeed, a rebuttable legal presumption might be created
in favor of a change of venue in capital cases that have generated a certain significant quantity of publicity, or for those in
which properly conducted, reliable community surveys empirically document that specified high levels of pretrial case
awareness and prejudgment exist.
It is also worth recognizing the important role that effective jury selection can play in enhancing the fairness of certain
capital trials. However, to achieve this goal, courts would need
to insure that high quality, expansive voir dire is permitted
and practiced in capital cases, so that potentially prejudiced jurors can be ferreted out. In addition to making capital voir dire
more effective by expanding its scope, its problematic features
would need to be addressed and eliminated. This will not be
easy. Specifically, because the negative effects of death qualification flow from its structurally anomalous position in the jury
selection process, they can be effectively addressed only by
somehow eliminating the death qualification of the guilt phase
jury. This would require a separate jury to be death qualified
(or the guilt-phase jury to be subsequently death qualified) and
empowered to proceed with sentencing if and only if the defendant is convicted of a death-eligible crime. lls
At the very least, more attention needs to be paid in jury
selection to the issue of mitigation so that prospective jurors
are questioned about whether and how they would give particular kinds of mitigating evidence life-giving effect. As John
Blume and his colleagues have noted, it means that "voir dire
should ensure that the venire members seated on the jury are
empowered to react to mitigating evidence in accordance with
the dictates of their conscience, even in the face of adverse reactions from other jurors."119 However, in order to get to this
118 That is, the procedure might entail the subsequent death qualification of the
original guilt· phase jury (augmented by additional alternate jurors, selected at the
time that the guilt-phase jury is impaneled and substituted as needed for original jurors who are not death qualified). Or, it might entail a process of bifurcation in which
a completely separate penalty-phase jury is impaneled. This second jury might be selected and seated at the outset of the guilt-phase trial, and assume full responsibilities
only after a penalty trial became necessary. Alternatively, such a second jury might be
selected and impaneled from a new pool of prospective jurors drawn if and when the
defendant was convicted.
119 John H. Blume et aI., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir
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point, prospective jurors would need to receive an accurate explanation of mitigation and attorneys would need to be given
an opportunity to question veniremen to determine whether
they are willing to at least consider mitigation in their penaltyphase decision-making.
With respect to the capital trial process itself, the virtually
exclusive focus on crime-related evidence and correspondingly
minimal attention given to the personhood of the defendant in
the guilt phase of the trial has a morally distancing effect on
the jurors. This is exacerbated in the penalty phase of the trial
by the initial, exclusive focus on crime-related evidence. Only
then is the presentation of contextualizing, social historical information about the defendant possible. Capital trial procedures might address these order effects by broadening the
scope of permissible guilt-phase testimony (for example, by allowing the defense to introduce evidence that humanizes the
defendant and contextualizes his actions).
Consideration
might also be given to allowing the defense the option of both
opening and closing the penalty trial.
With respect to the all-important penalty phase instructions, a strong argument can be made in favor of revising them
in ways that will make them comprehensible. In addition,
courts that are serious about increasing the reliability and
fairness of capital jury decision-making will need to consider
making sure not only that the instructions are adequately understood by jurors but also that they are not laboring under
any of the widespread misconceptions that are both likely to be
held by the typical capital juror and introduce error into the
death-sentencing process.l 20
Recently conducted research shows that it is possible to
correct and improve some of the most problematic features of
the capital jury sentencing instructions. Thus, a relatively
straightforward modification in the standard California penalty phase instruction that relied on linguistic principles to
simplify some of the most cumbersome and confusing language,
and the inclusion of pinpoint instructions that provided caseDire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2001).
120 See Anthony Paduano & Clive Stafford· Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 211, 214·230 (1987); Benjamin Steiner, William Bowers & Austin Sarat,

Folk Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 LAw & SOC'y REV. 461, 499 (1999).
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related examples of key terms (i.e., specific pieces of evidence
that were either aggravating or mitigating) both significantly
improved participants' understanding of the concepts of aggravation and mitigation.1 21 Although this study represents only
an initial step in answering this important question, these encouraging results suggest that there are ways to improve instructional comprehension and increase reliability of the capital jury decision-making process.
Finally, many wrongful condemnations have likely come
about because the law has not required attorneys to perform effectively in the penalty phase of capital cases by humanizing
their clients and contextualizing their lives in ways that would
allow jurors to better understand them and to weigh the full
range issues that are supposed to guide their decision-making
at this stage. In too many cases where attorneys have failed to
do this, jurors must render verdicts on the basis of knowledge
and information that is inadequate, skewed, or just plain
wrong.
Of course, no amount of legal reform, including specific
proposals made in the preceding pages, can succeed without
the presence of competent lawyers who have the resources,
skill, and opportunity to take proper advantage of it. Despite
recently promulgated guidelines indicating that attorneys
should have extensive experience and training before they represent a death penalty defendant, under-funded, undertrained, and inexperienced attorneys continue to handle capital
cases. 122 For example, the ABA standards that govern the appointment, training, and monitoring of defense counsel in capital cases establish an attainable model for the proper representation of a capital client. 123 Despite their reasonableness and
the imprimatur of the ABA, no state currently requires that
these standards be adhered to.124
121 Amy Smith & Craig Haney, Get to the Point: The Use of Pinpoint Instructions
to Improve Juror Instructional Comprehension in Capital Penalty Trials (2004) (unpub·
lished manuscript, on file with author).
122 See, e.g., Stephen Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 10l.
123 See American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Perform·
ance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003).
124 For example, Elisabeth Semel, then Director of the ABA's Capital Representa·
tion Project, speaking about states in the Southern "death belt" of the United States,
observed that, even if the states had adopted standards for the appointment of counsel,
"they most certainly are not the minimum standards the ABA put into place over
eleven years ago. Indeed, because of the refusal to adequately fund counsel, the stan-
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The failure to follow these minimal standards is likely to
continue to produce miscarriages of justice at the penalty phase
stages of capital cases, resulting in wrongful condemnations
that would have resulted in life sentences had competent counsel handled them.

IV. CONCLUSION
Michael McCann, the elected District Attorney for Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, was no doubt correct when he asserted that our nation's criminal justice system is plagued by
an "epidemic of wrongful convictions," brought about by an
"epidemic of errors" that undermine the fairness and reliability
of the process by which factual guilt is assigned.l 25 But the
same error-plagued system that produces wrongful convictions
is responsible for deciding on legal and moral guilt in capital
cases. As I have suggested in the preceding pages, there is
much reason to believe that it accomplishes these tasks with
even less fairness and reliability. To be sure, the decision of
whether a defendant "deserves" the death penalty presents profoundly complex legal and moral issues. Even in an ideal system, attorneys, judges, and jurors would be forced to grapple
with a host of deep and difficult psychological, intellectual, and
even spiritual questions. By confusing these issues and clouding these questions, our system of death sentencing helps to insure that there are too many capital defendants who, even
though they may be factually guilty, are wrongfully condemned.

dards are honored, if at all, in the breach." Elisabeth Semel, Call to Action: A Morato·
rium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L. REV. 117, 137 (2002).
125 Michael McCann, Call to Action: A Moratorium on Executions, 4 N. Y. CITY L.
REV. 117, 165 (2002).
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